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AGAINST REGULATORY STIMULUS 
ERIK F. GERDING* 
I 
INTRODUCTION
The 2012 JOBS Act1 deserves close scrutiny not only because of its impact on
federal securities laws, but because it represented an attempt by Congress to use
deregulation as a macroeconomic tool to jumpstart growth. When enacted in 
2012, the U.S. economy was still struggling to recover from the global financial 
crisis. After the crisis, traditional macroeconomic tools were either rendered 
ineffective or appeared politically infeasible. Interest rates were already close to 
zero, and fears grew that global economies had entered a “liquidity trap.”2 
Meanwhile, the Republican-controlled House of Representatives consistently 
blocked Democrats’ fiscal spending initiatives. With traditional monetary and 
fiscal channels blocked, Congress enacted the JOBS Act, which offered a third
potential way to stimulate the economy: deregulation of the financial sector. The
text,3 legislative history,4 and media reports5 of the JOBS Act all include
descriptions of the legislation as attempting an alternative form of 
macroeconomic stimulus. 
This framing should not be casually dismissed as an anomaly, notwithstanding
the fact that many members of Congress may have seized on economic conditions
Copyright © 2020 by Erik F. Gerding. 
This Article is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Professor of Law and Wolf-Nichol Fellow, University of Colorado Law School. I thank Anna Gelpern,
Daniel Hemel, Olivier Jeanne, and participants at the Law and Macroeconomics Conference at 
Georgetown Law on September 27–28, 2019 for feedback. 
1. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
2. For one academic view at the time, see Paul Krugman, How Much of The World Is in a Liquidity
Trap?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2010, 8:48 AM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/17/how-much-
of-the-world-is-in-a-liquidity-trap/?auth=login-smartlock [https://perma.cc/6UZK-EKA4]. A liquidity 
trap describes a market phenomenon in which extremely low interest rates make holding bonds
unattractive, prompting investors to hold cash. See generally Gauti H. Eggertsson, Liquidity Trap, in THE 
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (2008). 
3. The statute’s preamble explained that the legislative intent was “[t]o increase American job 
creation and economic growth by improving access to the public capital markets for emerging growth 
companies.”  Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act preamble, 126 Stat. at 306. 
4. H.R. REP. NO. 112–406, at 1 (2012). 
5. Alexandra Alper, Obama Signs Bill to Boost Business Startups, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2012, 3:58
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-jobsact/obama-signs-bill-to-boost-/business-startups-idU/ 
SBRE83414F20120405 [https://perma.cc/F7YL-AE4Y]; Michael Lewis, What Is the JOBS Act (Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups), MONEYCRASHERS, https://www.moneycrashers.com/jobs-act-business-startups/ 
[https://perma.cc/3NFU-8V36]; Amy M. Wilkinson, JOBS Act a Win for Startups and Economy, CNN 
(Apr. 10, 2012, 6:15 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/04/09/opinion/ wilkinson-jobs-act/index.html 
[https://perma.cc/65Y9-925S]. 
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as pretext for long-sought deregulation of capital formation or the fact that the 
“Great Recession” officially ended in June 2009.6 Indeed, the JOBS Act may
serve as precedent. With the United States and other countries experiencing 
persistent low interest rates, rising national debt levels, polarized electorates, and 
political climates favoring austerity, policymakers may be tempted to see the
JOBS Act as precedent and respond to the next recession or even the next 
financial crisis with financial deregulation.7 Policymakers would have scholarly 
support; Yair Listokin, for example, advocates using non-financial deregulation 
as “expansionary legal policy” to help economies escape a liquidity trap when 
interest rates approach zero and politics constrain traditional fiscal stimulus.8 
The prospect that regulatory change may increasingly be used as
macroeconomic stimulus, particularly during liquidity traps, demands a careful 
consideration of the effectiveness of this tool. Are regulatory changes an effective 
policy lever to stimulate aggregate demand and catalyze economic growth and 
job creation during an economic downturn? Unlike Listokin’s work, this Article
focuses on financial regulation, particularly deregulation.9 I define “regulatory 
stimulus” as financial deregulation used as an instrument of macroeconomic 
policy to stimulate growth during a recession, particularly in a liquidity trap.
Working within an efficiency framework, this Article seeks to answer two 
questions: first, whether and when regulatory stimulus is effective in promoting
macroeconomic growth, particularly in a severe recession or liquidity trap; and 
second, if regulatory stimulus is effective, whether it is worth the potential 
tradeoffs in terms of longer-term macroeconomic policy objectives. Ultimately, I
find grounds for skepticism that financial deregulation can effectively stimulate
economies suffering from a liquidity trap. Moreover, if regulatory stimulus
effectively achieves its aims, it may create significant intertemporal tradeoffs. A 
short-term economic punch can come at the cost of economic institutions that 
promote long-term financial stability and sustained growth. Accordingly, 
policymakers should demand clear empirical evidence of deregulation’s efficacy
before weakening a particular regulation in an effort to stimulate the economy. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II sets out a macroeconomic and legal 
framework for analyzing the effectiveness of regulatory stimulus in providing a
macroeconomic boost in a deep recession or liquidity trap. Part III both (a) 
6. See Robert Rich, The Great Recession, FED. RESERVE HISTORY (Nov. 22, 2013),
https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/great_recession_of_200709 [https://perma.cc/8GJ7-KLM3] 
(providing dates for the Great Recession). 
7. This would reverse the historic trend of financial crises resulting in new and more restrictive
securities, banking, and corporate laws. See ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES AND FINANCIAL
REGULATION 65 (2014) (noting the “regulatory backlash” which follows economic crises); Stuart
Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evidence, 75 WASH. U. L. REV. 849, 850
(1997) (“[M]ost of the major instances of new securities regulation in the past three hundred years of 
English and American history have come right after crashes.”). 
8. YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES TO RECESSIONS 16 (2019) 
[hereinafter LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS]; Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics: The
Law and Economics of Recessions, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 791 (2017). 
9.  The analysis in this Article could be extended, as Listokin does, to reduced enforcement levels. 
BOOK PROOF - GERDING (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2020 10:34 PM       
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
   
 51No. 1 2020] AGAINST REGULATORY STIMULUS
explains special features of financial regulation that make it the most natural 
candidate for deregulation designed to provide regulatory stimulus; and (b) 
discusses how the political economy of financial regulation means that legal 
interventions for macroeconomic purposes may function as a one-way ratchet to
deregulation. Part IV offers a brief case study analyzing whether the JOBS Act 
was an effective instrument of regulatory stimulus. Part V looks at the other side
of the ledger and considers the costs of rolling back securities and banking laws. 
It argues that the regulation-as-tax metaphor obscures long-term macroeconomic 
benefits of regulatory infrastructure in fostering investor confidence and building
trusted institutions that collect and verify information. Part VI concludes. 
II
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Policymakers who look to regulatory stimulus as a solution to a liquidity trap 
must do more than just assert that deregulation will spur capital investment or
job creation. They need both a macroeconomic and a legal framework for 
evaluating whether a given regulatory change would have the desired effects and 
would justify the policy tradeoffs. 
A Macroeconomic Framework 
1. Fiscal Versus Monetary Channels of Regulation
Before adopting a particular regulatory stimulus, policymakers need to 
understand and articulate how proposed deregulation would stimulate economic 
growth. Broadly speaking, regulatory stimulus might act through either a fiscal 
or a monetary channel. Regulatory stimulus could impact the real economy
through fiscal channels by triggering higher levels of spending by households and 
businesses. Economists speak of this mechanism in terms of increasing 
“aggregate demand” in the economy.10 This might occur if the liberalization of
securities or banking laws catalyzes greater lending or investment by financial 
intermediaries. However, relaxing legal constraints on credit or investment does
not necessarily mean households or businesses will borrow more or seek more
capital.11 Nor does it mean that financial intermediaries will lend or invest more. 
A good macroeconomic model justifying a particular regulatory stimulus would
specify in detail the mechanism by which deregulation would increase spending. 
It would also specify the economic actors whose behavior would change.
Alternatively, regulatory stimulus might operate via a monetary channel by
increasing the stock or accelerating the flow of money in the economy. One type 
of channel might involve legal rules that allow financial intermediaries to create
10. Listokin’s work focuses primarily on fiscal channels intended to increase demand. LISTOKIN,
LAW AND MACROECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
11. See infra Part II(A)(3) (discussing the impact of uncertainty and expectations on the effects of
macroeconomic policy). 
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new private money claims.12 Another monetary channel might work via a money 
multiplier effect.13 For instance, lowering the amount of reserves that banks are 
required to hold in a system of fractional reserve banking can exert a money 
multiplier effect.14 Lower reserves requirements mean that one bank can lend
more to customers who deposit their money in a second bank, and the second 
bank can then also lend more. The loan from the second bank is ultimately 
redeposited in the banking system and so forth.15 Economists and legal scholars 
have argued that leverage/margin requirements in crucial financial markets, such 
as those for repos16 and credit derivatives,17 operate similarly. When financial 
market participants post lower amounts of collateral in these credit transactions,
the effective money supply grows just as if reserve requirements were lower.18 
In either case, monetary channels may not prove effective in stimulating an 
economy stuck in a liquidity trap. As with fiscal channels, more permissive legal
rules do not necessarily translate into more credit.19 Looser legal rules do not 
always mean that financial institutions will create more money claims, borrow or 
lend more, or consent to counterparties posting lower collateral for financial
transactions.20 
2. Magnitude and Calibration 
For a deregulatory policy to increase aggregate demand or catalyze monetary 
expansion, its effects must reach a certain magnitude, particularly when the 
economy is mired in a liquidity trap. For the effects of regulatory stimulus to be 
deep and widespread, the regulation must not only affect a broad swath of 
financial intermediaries or investors; it must also induce them to significantly
increase lending or investment. However, deregulation may not translate into 
more credit or investment, as seen in an ongoing academic debate on the effect 
of capital requirements.21 Some economists have questioned the logic that higher
12. See, e.g., MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 93– 
101 (2015) (hypothesizing that the creation of money claims by financial institutions generated the global 
financial crisis and other historical crises). 
13. N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MACROECONOMICS 348–49 (2008). 
14. Id.
 15. Id.
16. Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Money, Liquidity, and Monetary Policy, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 
600, 604–05 (2009). 
17. See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Credit Derivatives, Leverage, and Financial Regulation’s Missing
Macroeconomic Dimension, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 29 (2011). 
18. Id. at 41–42. 
19. See infra notes 22–23 (describing economist arguments that capital requirements do not
necessarily affect bank lending); see also infra notes 30–33 (describing how economic uncertainty during
recessions may cause economic actors not to invest). 
20. I will revisit this problem in the context of expectations and the “pushing on a string” problem. 
See infra discussion in Part II(A)(4). 
21. See, e.g., Ben Bradford, Bank CEOs Ask Congress to Loosen Capital Requirements, 
MARKETPLACE (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.marketplace.org/2019/04/11/bank-ceos-ask-congress-
loosen-capital-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/EJ47-VRPK] (observing that bank executives and 
academics disagree over whether higher capital requirements stifle lending). 
BOOK PROOF - GERDING (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2020 10:34 PM       
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
 
      
  
  
       
  
   
 
 
 
    
     
  
 
 53No. 1 2020] AGAINST REGULATORY STIMULUS
capital requirements necessarily translate into lower lending.22 A lower capital
requirement allows a financial institution to pay dividends to its shareholders or 
buy back shares instead of extending credit.23 In addition, multiplier effects can
be very difficult to measure.24 Moreover, policies that stimulate particular asset
classes or financial markets may not translate into a broad macroeconomic 
stimulus, but might inflate specific asset markets, creating bubbles that make 
economies vulnerable to future crises.25 
In analyzing and deploying traditional fiscal and monetary tools, 
policymakers and economists want to calibrate to have a measured effect, not to 
merely clear a de minimis threshold. Ideally, they want tools that work both ways,
so that they can heat up the economy and later cool it down. The macroeconomic 
effects of changes in legal rules may not be easily-measurable, let alone
susceptible to fine-tuning. In addition, as argued below, political dynamics may 
lead to a one-way ratchet towards financial deregulation.
3. Policy Lag 
The time it takes for regulatory stimulus to provide a macroeconomic jolt 
matters immensely. Even if deregulation exerts a sufficiently large stimulatory 
effect, the liquidity trap may persist or the recession may have ended. Additional 
22. Regulatory capital requirements do not require banks to hold funds in reserve; they merely
affect the right-hand side of a bank’s balance sheet and the bank’s mix of funding. Established finance
theory calls into question whether debt or equity financing is more expensive for a bank or any firm. See
ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG WITH
BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 100, 100–02 (2013) (discussing flaws in the argument that equity 
funding is more expensive because shareholders demand higher returns than debt holders require). 
23. Post-crisis regulatory relief and better bank performance on stress tests enabled banks to pay 
higher dividends. Lawrence C. Strauss, Big Banks Are About to Offer Up Higher Stock Dividends, 
BARRON’S (June 13, 2019, 9:36 AM), https://www.barrons.com/articles/big-banks-higher-dividends-
goldman-sachs-morgan-stanley-wells-fargo-capital-one-ccar-stress-test-51560370781 
[https://perma.cc/977A-KQ22]. 
24. See  NICOLETTA BATINI ET AL., INT’L MONETARY FUND, FISCAL MULTIPLIERS: SIZE,
DETERMINANTS, AND USE IN MACROECONOMIC PROJECTIONS 2 (2014) (noting that multipliers are not 
widely used by economists because they are difficult to estimate). 
25. I have written previously about the historical pattern of the relaxation of financial and corporate 
laws being followed by asset price booms and bubbles in the associated financial markets. GERDING, 
supra note 7, at 48. However, there is an important distinction between an asset price bubble in a 
particular market and a broader macroeconomic effect. This distinction undergirds the economic 
arguments against using monetary policy to target asset price bubbles. Raising interest rates, the logic 
goes, would put a damper on the entire economy with potentially significant spillover costs, instead of
narrowly targeting the market that is overheating. See, e.g., Marvin Goodfriend, Interest Rate Policy 
Should Not React Directly to Asset Prices, in  ASSET PRICE BUBBLES: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
MONETARY, REGULATORY, AND INTERNATIONAL POLICIES 445 (William C. Hunter et al. eds., 2003);
Ben S. Bernanke & Mark Gertler, Monetary Policy and Asset Price Volatility, FED. RES. BANK KANSAS
CITY ECON. REV. 17, (4th Q. 1999) (arguing against using monetary policy to address asset prices and 
bubbles directly instead of targeting overall inflation). The same logic applies to the reverse situation, 
namely efforts to stimulate particular asset markets. Providing a jolt to a particular asset market does not 
necessarily translate into a broader macroeconomic effect. 
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stimulus may then contribute to inflation risks if the stimulatory effect lags or
lingers.26 
4. Expectations and the “Pushing on a String” Problem
Expectations and uncertainty can also dampen the effects of regulatory
stimulus. Lenders and investors might change their behavior in anticipation of 
regulatory stimulus taking effect. Alternatively, they might not respond to
regulatory changes in the way policymakers intended. Contemporary
macroeconomic thought focuses not only on current economic conditions and 
policies, but also on the expectations of economic actors with respect to future
conditions and policies. Expectations can cause behavior to diverge radically 
from policymakers’ assumptions.27 Regulatory stimulus, Listokin’s 
“expansionary legal policy,”28 or any other policy in a law and macroeconomics 
vein must consider whether rule changes are working with, altering, or fighting
against expectations about future economic conditions and policies. It is unclear 
if any act of deregulation would be large enough to change market expectations 
about the economic future. Regulatory stimulus might have the opposite effect 
intended by signaling to the market that policymakers have abandoned
traditional fiscal stimulus tools with a proven track record. 
In addition, lenders and investors might believe that regulatory stimulus will 
be reversed in the future once economic conditions change, dimming their 
incentives to commit capital long-term. Economic actors might seek a credible 
political commitment that the regulatory stimulus will not be quickly undone,
eroding the value of investments made in reliance on the policy change. 
Macroeconomists have debated the effects of policy regime switching in 
monetary policy, and scholars have advocated simple, mechanical rules to anchor
expectations.29 Settling market expectations about the future course of policy 
may prove harder in the case of complex legal changes.
26. Macroeconomists have long been concerned with time lags in policy, often separating them into
“inside lags”—the time it takes policymakers to recognize and decide upon a policy response to an
economic shock—and “outside lags”—the time it takes for a chosen policy to have a macroeconomic
effect. For very old literature on inside lags, see Patric H. Hendershott, The Inside Lag in Monetary 
Policy: A Comment, 74(5) J. POL. ECON. 519 (1966). For a discussion of outside lags, see, for example, E. 
Philip Howrey, On the Outside Lag of Monetary Policy, 20(2) METROECONOMICA 111 (1968). 
27. See generally G.K. Shaw, Expectations in Macroeconomics, in CURRENT ISSUES IN 
MACROECONOMICS 22, 24 (D. Greenaway ed., 1989). For a user-friendly summary of the debate among 
macroeconomists on the effects of rational expectations on monetary policy, see Flint Brayton et al., The
Role of Expectations in the FRB/US Macroeconomic Model, FED. RESERVE BULLETIN 227, 227–29 (Apr. 
1997) (noting that economists disagree about the basis on which individuals form expectations and about
how to model individuals’ expectations). 
28. LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
29. See, e.g., Andrew T. Foerster, Monetary Policy Regime Switches and Macroeconomic Dynamics
(Fed. Reserve Bank Kan. City Research, Working Paper No. 13–04, 2014), https://www.kansascity/ 
fed.org/publicat/reswkpap/pdf/rwp13-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX46-5569].
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Economic uncertainty also leads to the “pushing on a string” problem, which 
can afflict macroeconomic policy during (and before) economic downturns.30 
This problem arises when investors, firms, and financial institutions are uncertain
and pessimistic about the economic future.31 Uncertainty may lessen appetites for 
risk-taking.32 Thus, looser monetary policy may not induce greater spending, 
investment, or lending.33 Regulatory stimulus, depending on the channel, may 
confront the same problem: lowering regulatory impediments to spending,
lending, or capital investment may not prompt economic actors to spend, lend, or 
invest more in the face of uncertainty. In most Western economies, policymakers 
may lower regulatory restrictions but typically cannot compel investment or 
lending.
B. Legal Overlay: Types of Regulatory Stimulus 
The type of legal intervention may determine the effectiveness of regulatory
stimulus. Policymakers can seek a macroeconomic stimulus via deregulation in
different areas of the law, or by field. Within the broad field of financial services,
policymakers might pursue deregulation in different sub-fields, such as securities 
or banking law. Different regulatory levers can affect the particular channel for 
regulatory stimulus, as well as its magnitude and time lag. Rules that directly turn 
on the spigots for capital investment or credit may prove the most effective 
regulatory stimulus tools, particularly when that investment or credit catalyzes 
hiring or other spending in the economy. 
Regulatory stimulus can also be classified by the type of policy instrument 
adopted and by the legal actor that crafted the policy. A country’s legal ground 
rules clarify what particular policy instruments are available to particular legal 
actors, governing the process, scope, speed, and duration for any legal change.
We can conceptualize different types of legal changes according to a hierarchy of 
legal process, provided in Figure 1. Actions higher on the hierarchy have more 
far-reaching consequences, but require more legal process and the involvement 
of more legal actors representing a larger share of a nation’s polity.
30. See generally Mark Blyth, The Last Days of Pushing on a String, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 7,
2012), https://hbr.org/2012/08/the-last-days-of-pushing-on-a [https://perma.ccRN45-645R] (noting that 
banks have been less willing to lend due to uncertainty over the lack of demand in the economy). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
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Figure 1: The Legal Process Hierarchy
1. Constitutional Changes 
2. Legislation 
3. Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking 
4. Agency Licenses; Agency Adjudications 
5. Interpretative guidance 
6. Changes in supervisory priorities for regulators
This hierarchy roughly illustrates the tradeoff between the magnitude of
effects for a legal rule change and potential time lag.34 Actions on the higher rungs 
of the ladder may have the broadest and most pronounced macroeconomic 
effects. However, legal and political roadblocks mean that these changes require
the longest time to enact and occur the most infrequently. Moreover, these
changes happen at a high level of generality and often require policymakers to 
implement them via actions lower down the hierarchy. 
Deregulation might also be understood along another dimension, namely 
whether policymakers seek to change the substance or structure of a legal rule or
whether they seek to change the quantitative level of a rule.35 Quantitative 
changes function more as a knob or dial, whereas substantive structural changes 
change the architecture of a legal regime. Quantitative rules may have less lag 
time, but their impact in terms of expectations is harder to predict. Market 
participants may find quantitative changes easier to understand, which might 
translate into clearer behavioral changes. On the other hand, participants might 
doubt how long a quantitative change will last; they may worry that policymakers 
could easily turn a dial backwards.  
III
WHY FINANCIAL REGULATION IS DIFFERENT
A. Clearer Channels 
Listokin chose to exclude financial regulation from his analysis of 
“expansionary legal policy.”36 I take the opposite approach and focus exclusively 
on financial regulation for several reasons. Financial regulation offers potentially 
clearer and stronger fiscal channels than the areas of regulation examined by 
Listokin, given the role of capital markets and financial institutions in capital 
investment and credit. Financial regulation also opens up potential monetary 
34. Some of the rungs in the middle of the ladder may change places depending on context. For 
example, settlements of adjudications that require the consent only of the regulatory agency and one 
other party may have less of a time lag. 
35. Examples of quantitative rules would be changing the percentage or ratio in margin rules (which 
determines how much credit can be used for securities or derivative transactions); bank reserve 
requirements in a fractional reserve banking system; or bank leverage or capital ratios. 
36. LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
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channels, given the role of financial institutions and markets in creating money37 
and serving as a “transmission belt for monetary policy.”38 The JOBS Act
provides an example of regulatory stimulus for analysis. 
B. The Political Economy of Financial Regulation and the One-Way Ratchet 
Analyzing the effectiveness and tradeoffs of regulatory stimulus requires 
careful consideration not only of macroeconomic and legal factors, but also of 
the political economy of the given area of law. Unique features of the political 
economy of financial regulation mean that regulatory stimulus may act as a one-
way ratchet towards deregulation. Fundamental deregulation has been seen as a 
remedy for a downturn, but few politicians tout re-regulation as a useful 
dampener for an overheating economy.39 This stems in part from the politics of 
macroeconomic policy. Few elected officials are willing to stake their political
futures on removing the economic punchbowl just as the party gets started. This 
political dynamic grows stronger in the midst of extreme economic booms and 
potential asset price bubbles.40 
Moreover, prudential financial regulation—that is, regulation that aims to 
mitigate systemic risk or the incidence and severity of financial crises—has a 
different political economy than many other fields of regulation. In contrast with
environmental law, fewer concentrated interest groups favor prudential financial 
regulation and oppose industry groups pushing for deregulation. Unlike 
environmental law, where it may be possible to separate noxious effects from 
economic benefits, it is not obvious to generate more reward without more risk-
taking in reasonably-efficient markets. No one likes dioxin. Almost everyone 
supports credit and investment. Without some engineered interest group
pluralism, as with a highly segmented financial services sector or an active
plaintiffs’ bar, there is little political pressure to reverse a regulatory stimulus 
when the economy improves.41 
IV
A BRIEF CASE STUDY: THE JOBS ACT
With macroeconomic and legal frameworks in place, we can sketch a 
preliminary analysis of whether the JOBS Act represented effective regulatory 
stimulus.
37. See, e.g., RICKS, supra note 12, at 52–62 (discussing the role of banks in money creation). 
38. FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, ANNUAL REPORT 1982: ARE BANKS SPECIAL? (1982)
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/frbminn/1982_frb_minneapolis.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
H79Z-UGVY]. 
39. One exception is price controls. For a history of, and argument against, using price regulation as
a tool to combat inflation, see ROBERT L. SCHUETTINGER & EAMONN F. BUTLER, FORTY CENTURIES
OF WAGE AND PRICE CONTROLS: HOW NOT TO FIGHT INFLATION (2009). 
40. GERDING, supra note 7, at 158. 
41. Id. 
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A. Channel and Magnitude 
Congress did not attempt to specify the channel by which the JOBS Act would
have a macroeconomic impact. None of the statutory provisions involve the 
creation of money-like instruments, nor do they loosen bank reserve 
requirements or analogous rules. Therefore, Congress did not appear to attempt 
to use monetary channels to stimulate economic growth through the JOBS Act.
This leaves a fiscal channel as the only possibility.
It is hard to specify how the various provisions of the JOBS Act would
increase aggregate demand. Parts of the statute (the so-called “emerging growth 
company” provisions) reduce the periodic disclosure requirements for public 
companies that have $1 billion or less in total annual gross revenue.42 But it is far 
from clear how these provisions would induce more spending by these
companies. Would emerging growth companies use any saved compliance costs 
from reduced mandatory periodic disclosure rules to hire more employees or 
increase capital expenditures? Moreover, not all of the saved compliance costs 
would count as a net macroeconomic benefit; much of securities law compliance
costs constitute payments to lawyers and accountants,43 who would presumably
spend much of their earnings. It is difficult to construct a plausible case for lower 
levels of transparency created by looser financial reporting encouraging more
hiring or expenditures. 
Other JOBS Act provisions create new exemptions from U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) registration for securities issuances conducted in a 
specified manner—the so-called crowdfunding exemption and the Regulation
A+ exemptions.44 Proponents of the JOBS Act offered little compelling evidence 
that liberalizing the legal requirements for securities offerings would lead to 
greater total capital raising. Moreover, exempt offerings are substitutes for public 
offerings. Therefore, some portion of additional money raised through exempt 
offerings might have been raised in public offerings instead.45 Furthermore, the
various kinds of exempt offerings, including Regulation D, crowdfunding,
42. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 78m (2018). 
43. PWC DEALS, CONSIDERING AN IPO TO FUEL YOUR COMPANY’S FUTURE? INSIGHT INTO THE 
COSTS OF GOING PUBLIC AND BEING PUBLIC 6 (2017), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/deals/publications/ 
assets/cost-of-an-ipo.pdf [https://perma.cc/J957-8WJH] (providing range of costs of professional services
for issuers conducting an IPO). 
44. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, 77d(a)(b), 78c(h), 78l(g) & 78o(a)(1) (containing the principle statutory
provisions on crowdfunding); id. §§ 77c(b)(2)–(5) (listing the Regulation A+ exemptions). SEC 
registration subjects issuers to an expensive and intensive SEC review of required financial and narrative
disclosures that must be given to potential investors before they can purchase offered securities. The SEC 
can block any sales of securities before it completes this review, and issuers cannot communicate with
the investing public while this review is underway. 
45. See Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the Decline of the Public 
Company, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 445, 468–69 (2017) (noting that exemptions from securities regulation have 
significantly enhanced issuers’ ability to raise private capital). 
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Regulation A, and Regulation A+, are substitutes for one another.46 This means 
that changing the exemptions for these various rules might simply reallocate 
capital-raising among different exempted categories instead of increasing the
total amount raised. The JOBS Act changes to the different exemptions may 
have had little effect on the relative attractiveness of exemptions relative to one 
another.47 
Further, Congress failed to collect data on how companies actually use the
proceeds of exempt offerings. Even if liberalized offerings would lead to greater 
securities issuances, it is not clear that companies would spend the money to hire
new employees or make capital expenditures that they otherwise would not have.
Offering proceeds could be used instead to repurchase shares or refinance debt.
The JOBS Act also includes provisions allowing private companies to avoid 
registering with the SEC and thus avoid mandatory periodic disclosure and rules 
on proxy contests.48 JOBS Act proponents did not produce compelling evidence 
that private companies would hire more employees or make larger capital 
investments even if they save on various compliance costs associated with public 
company status. Proponents of the JOBS Act lauded it for promoting more Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs).49 The emerging growth company provisions reduce the 
disclosure requirements for public companies. The statute also allows companies 
to “test the waters” for an IPO by contacting potential institutional investors 
without running afoul of the Securities Act. However, the JOBS Act also expands
both the ability of companies to avoid public registration and transaction 
exemptions. The net effect of these rules on IPOs is thus muddled, although some 
studies do link a spike in IPOs in 2014 and 2015 due to the JOBS Act.50 What is 
clear, however, is that these various provisions of the JOBS Act reduce the 
overall securities disclosure requirements for companies, despite scant empirical
46. See generally John C. Coates, Private vs. Political Choice of Securities Regulation: A Political 
Cost/Benefit Analysis, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 531, 544–49 (2001) (describing the choices of transaction
exemptions and SEC registration available to securities issuers). 
47. Before the JOBS Act, Regulation D offered perhaps the most attractive set of conditions of all 
transaction exemptions, as indicated by the sheer size of Regulation D offerings. The amount of capital 
raised annually through Regulation D alone is larger than the amount raised through public equity and
debt offerings. SCOTT BAUGESS, RACHITA GULLAPALLI & VLADIMIR IVANOV, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, CAPITAL RAISING IN THE U.S.: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARKET FOR UNREGISTERED
SECURITIES OFFERINGS, 2009–2017, at 4 (2018) https://www.sec.gov/files/DERA%20white%20/paper_/ 
Regulation%20D_082018.pdf [https://perma.cc/ J9X7-LCWL]. While the JOBS Act created new 
exemptions, it also liberalized Regulation D. For example, the JOBS Act amended Regulation D to allow 
issuers to conduct general solicitation of investors. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. 112-
106, 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012). The net result of the sum of JOBS Act exemptions may have been to 
entrench further the status of Regulation D as the queen of exemptions. 
48.  Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, 126 Stat. at 325. 
49. Martin Wellington & Sarah Solum, On Its One-Year Anniversary, Two Cheers for the JOBS Act, 
FORBES (Mar. 28, 2013, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/03/28/on-its-one-year-
anniversary-two-cheers-for-the-jobs-act/#3cd6e0f3395c [https://perma.cc/J3N4-SA8M]. 
50. For one study showing that the JOBS Act did increase IPO volume, see generally Michael 
Dambra, Laura Casares Field & Matthew T. Gustafson, The JOBS Act and IPO Volume: Evidence that
Disclosure Costs Affect the IPO Decision, 116 J. FIN. ECON. 121 (2015). 
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evidence that this increases capital raising, let alone aggregate macroeconomic 
demand. 
B. Policy Lag 
Four of the seven titles in the JOBS Act became immediately effective when 
Congress enacted the statute in April 2012.51 The other JOBS Act provisions 
required notice-and-comment rulemaking by the SEC.52 Congress included in the 
Act various deadlines for the SEC to issue final rules implementing statutory
provisions. However, the SEC missed many of these deadlines. 53 The following 
chart highlights the timeline for some of the principal rulemakings under the 
JOBS Act.
Table 1: Policy Lag in the JOBS Act 
Statutory Provision Date SEC Issued 
Principal Final Rule 
Effective Date 
of Final Rule 
Did SEC Meet 
Statutory Deadline? 
Title I: Emerging Growth 
Companies
Statutory provisions
immediately effective
 NA
Title II: Regulation D 
General Solicitation 
July 2013 September 2013 Yes 
Title III – Crowdfunding 
Exemption 
October 2015 May 2016 No 
Title IV – Regulation A+ March 2015 June 2015 No 
Title V-VI – Exchange 
Act (Public Company 
Registration)
Statutory provisions
immediately effective
 NA
SEC rulemaking implementing JOBS Act provisions continued even after the 
final rules listed above. Table 1 shows that, in the case of some rules, the 
additional outside lag, that is, the time it takes for new macroeconomic policies 
to take effect,54 was at least four years, measured from the statute’s enactment to 
the effective date of the final rule. Even for the immediately effective parts of the 
statute, the associated administrative process still creates a lag. For example, the 
emerging growth company provisions were intended to facilitate IPOs,55 but 
companies need SEC approval to complete an IPO. Some practitioners estimate
51. Testimony on “JOBS Act Implementation Update,” Hearing on Pub. L. 112–106 before the
Subcomm. on Investigations, Oversight and Regulations, H. Comm. on Small Bus., 113th Cong. (2013) 
(testimony of Lona Nallengara, Acting Dir., Div. of Corp. Fin. & John Ramsay, Acting Dir, Div. of 
Trading & Mkts., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2013-
ts041113lnjrhtm [https://perma.cc/WN7Q-BR8N]. 
52. Id.
53.  Sara N. Lynch, SEC will miss deadlines on JOBS Act rules-Schapiro, REUTERS (June 27, 2012), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/sec-jobsact-deadline/sec-will-miss-deadlines-on-jobs-act-rules-schapiro-
idUSL2E8HRFZO20120627 [https://perma.cc/M82W-J8T6].
54. The problem of outside lags has long been recognized in macroeconomics. See, e.g., E. Philip
Howrey, On the Outside Lag of Monetary Policy, 20(2) METROECONOMICA 111 (1968). 
55. Bonnie J. Roe, IPO On-Ramp: The Emerging Growth Company, BUS. L. TODAY (May 31, 
2012), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2012/05/04_roe/ [https://perm/ 
a.ccNFD4-YHUF]. 
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that SEC review alone can take 10 to 14 weeks.56 Many companies must take 
preparatory steps before the registration process begins, including implementing
corporate governance changes and preparing audited financial statements.57 
C. Expectations and Pushing on a String 
Again, relaxing restrictions on capital raising does not necessarily mean that, 
in the midst of a deep recession or liquidity trap, companies will (a) raise
additional capital, and (b) deploy that capital to hire more employees or make
capital expenditures.58 Reports do indicate that the JOBS Act led to some
increases in capital raising via the new or liberalized exemptions. Sixteen months 
after the final SEC rules implementing the JOBS Act Regulation A+ provisions
became effective in June 2015, Issuers requested approval for 147 Regulation A+
offerings seeking $2.6 billion in financing, and the SEC allowed 81 of these 
offerings, which sought to raise a combined $1.5 billion, to go forward.59 The SEC 
also estimated that, between May 16, 2016 and December 31, 2018, there were
1,351 offerings under its new crowdfunding rules.60 These offerings sought to raise 
in the aggregate a “target” (or minimum amount) of $94.3 million and a
maximum of $775.9 million.61 An SEC Study on Regulation D estimated that 
from the 2013 effective date of the rule that allowed general solicitation in certain 
Regulation D offerings through the end of 2017, only 4% or $255 billion of all 
Regulation D offerings relied on this new provision.62 That same study concluded
that “[c]apital raised through Regulation D offerings continues to be positively
correlated with public market performance, suggesting that capital formation in 
the unregistered market is pro cyclical, i.e., the strength of the unregistered
market is closely tied to the health of the public market and the overall 
economy.”63 
The study found an 89% correlation between Regulation D offerings with the
S&P 500 index from 1993 to 2017.64 It showed a peak in the Regulation D offering
56. Clancy Fossum, Going Public: The Pre-IPO Timeline, FIN. EXEC. INT’L DAILY (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.financialexecutives.org/FEI-Daily/March-2018/Going-Public-The-Pre-IPO-Timeline.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9XE9-UUE9]. 
57. Id. 
58. We cannot gauge how successful the JOBS Act was in inducing capital raising during a liquidity
trap because many of its provisions took effect via final regulations from 2013 to 2016. 
59. ANZHELA KNYAZEVA, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION A+: WHAT DO WE KNOW
SO FAR? 1 (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/dera/staff-papers/white-papers/18nov16_knyazeva_/ 
regulation-a-plus-what-do-we-know-so-far.html [https://perma.cc/A3UW-R8VP]. Note that regulatory
filings reveal the maximum amount the issuer sought to raise, not necessarily the actual amount. 
60. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE COMMISSION: REGULATION CROWDFUNDING 4 
(June 18, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/regulation-crowdfunding-2019_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/8S38-
XQFY].
 61. Id. at 14. 
62. BAUGESS, GULLAPALLI & IVANOV, supra note 47, at 5. 
63. Id. at 2. 
64. Id. at 12. 
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market in 2007, followed by a fall-off in 2008 during the global financial crisis.65 
The market recovered to its 2007 level only in 2012.66 This finding is consistent 
with prior academic research showing pro-cyclicality in IPOs and other public 
securities offerings.67 This suggests that firms are less able or willing to raise
capital during economic downturns.
V 
REGULATION AS TAX VERSUS REGULATION AS ARCHITECTURE
A. An Intertemporal Tradeoff 
Beyond the question of whether financial deregulation provides effective 
macroeconomic stimulus lurk two larger questions: what are the tradeoffs of 
pursuing financial deregulation; and is pursuing regulatory stimulus worth these
costs? The political deployment of regulatory stimulus benefits from a flaw 
inherent in the “regulation-as-tax” metaphor, which implies that lower “tax 
rates” (lower regulation) lead to greater economic growth. This overshadows the
role that financial laws and regulations play in creating institutions critical for 
long-term economic development. Deregulation might then trade the uncertain 
benefits of short-term macroeconomic stimulus for the uncertain costs of
compromising long-term legal/economic institutions. 
Epidemics of fraud and financial crises reveal this tradeoff, as a wide swath of 
banking and securities law addresses systemic risk and aims to mitigate financial
crises.68 Over the long-run, rollback of systemic risk rules may increase the
likelihood of future crises, trapping the economy in a vicious feedback loop.69 
Similarly, weakening antifraud rules risks new epidemics of a financial fraud, 
which erode investor trust in capital markets. Diluting accounting and financial 
disclosure rules hinders price discovery and the ability of markets to move past
financial crises.70 This type of financial deregulation could erode legal and 
economic institutions.71 
65. Id.
 66. Id. These findings do not necessarily support claims that liberalizing capital markets will spur 
economic growth during severe market downturns and liquidity traps. Indeed, causation may run the 
other way.
 67.  See, e.g., id. at 11 (citing Vladimir I. Ivanov & Craig M. Lewis, The Determinants of Market Wide
Issue Cycles for Initial Public Offerings, 14 J. CORP FIN. 567 (2008)); Hyuk Choe, Ronald Masulis & 
Vikram Nanda, Common Stock Offerings Across the Business Cycle: Theory and Evidence, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL FIN. 3 (1993); Michelle Lowry, Why Does IPO Volume Fluctuate So Much?, 67 J. FIN. ECON. 
3 (2003). 
68. See generally Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008) (surveying legal 
mechanisms to mitigate risk of financial crises).
 69. GERDING, supra note 7, at 383. 
70. Hans Hoogervorst, Do Not Blame Accounting Rules for the Financial Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 3,
2018), https://www.ft.com/content/bd084b5c-c623-11e8-86b4-bfd556565bb2 [https://perma.cc/NWX4-
J5W6]. 
71. See YALMAN ONARAN, ZOMBIE BANKS: HOW BROKEN BANKS AND DEBTOR NATIONS ARE
CRIPPLING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 22 (2012) (discussing the Japanese relationship with deregulatory
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B. Law as Scaffolding for Confidence 
The common thread in these different fields of financial law is the importance 
of investor confidence. It is crucial to move away from the regulation-as-tax view 
and consider the role of financial regulation in building this confidence. Securities 
regulators consider protecting investor confidence one of their central missions.72 
Likewise, for banking law, depositor confidence is the key to preventing bank 
runs and the systemic risk they pose.73 Removing financial regulations like these 
so soon after a financial crisis may create additional uncertainty about the
trustworthiness of financial institutions, markets, and intermediaries, and further
dampen economic activity. Confidence and the macroeconomic role of financial
regulation could be rephrased in institutional terms. Securities and banking law
create frameworks supporting long-term financial investment. These legal 
regimes create and support institutions—issuers, capital markets, investment 
funds and intermediaries, and banks—that serve as trusted generators and 
repositories of information.74 
VI
CONCLUSION
The criticisms of regulatory stimulus in this Article should not detract from
consideration of macroprudential tools. For example, countercyclical rules 
protect the stability of individual financial institutions and financial market by 
regulating more strenuously during market booms when financial risks spike and
relaxing during downturns when risks ebb. Automatic rules could address many
of the challenges for regulatory stimulus described in this Article. Their 
automatic application means a shorter time lag, insulation from political pressure,
a cure for the one-way ratchet, and a level of understandability and predictability
that fosters market expectations. However, countercyclical rules may work less 
stimulus, its long-term effects hampering economic growth, and role of accounting rules that delay
recognition of losses in creating zombie banks). 
72. See Tamar Frankel, Regulation and Investors’ Trust in the Securities Markets, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
439, 442 (2002); see also Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 408 
(2002) (“[T]here has been much talk among regulators and business leaders of the importance of 
maintaining investor confidence in the market.”).
73. Deposit insurance together with well-designed bank regulations to counteract the moral hazard
created by that insurance are crucial tools for preserving depositor confidence. See generally Giusy
Chesini & Elisa Giaretta, Depositor Discipline for Better or for Worse. What Enhanced Depositors’
Confidence on the Banking System in the Last Ten Years?, 51 J. INT’L FIN. MKTS. 209, 213–14 (2017);
Deniz Anginer & Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Bank Runs and Moral Hazard: A Review of Deposit Insurance 2 
(World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 8589, 2018), http://documents.worldbank.org/ 
curated/en/548031537377082747/pdf/WPS8589.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YCL-LHWG]. 
74. Some prominent macroeconomics scholarship adopts a similar institutional view. Ben Bernanke 
shows that the severity of the Great Depression was deepened when banks closed due to the destruction
of the valuable information individual bankers had on creditworthiness in their communities. Ben S.
Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression, 73(3) AM.
ECON. REV. 257, 257 (June 1983). 
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well as instruments of macroeconomic stimulus, underscoring the potential
tradeoff between short-term growth and long-term stability. 
Analyzing financial deregulation as a potential tool for macroeconomic 
stimulus yields important lessons for the larger law and macroeconomic project. 
First, specifying macroeconomic channels, measuring aggregate impacts, and 
considering policy lags are essential for evaluating any proposal to use legal 
interventions as macroeconomic tools. Second, law and macroeconomics must 
grapple with how the expectations of economic actors regarding future economic 
conditions or policies can thwart or support legal interventions used as 
macroeconomic policy. Third, we cannot evaluate any legal rule as an instrument 
of macroeconomic policy without considering the political economy of that area 
of law. Politics can blunt, delay, or entrench particular legal changes. In the case 
of financial regulation, it might create a one-way ratchet towards deregulation.
Fourth, it is difficult to identify the macroeconomic impacts of particular legal
interventions. Macroeconomics traffics in aggregate data and models, and 
aggregation may eclipse the effects of micro-changes in legal regimes. Finally, by 
creating foundations for institutions that collect and produce information,
generate investor confidence and trust, and mitigate systemic risk, legal regimes 
promote long-term growth. Financial regulatory regimes might thus be degraded 
at long-term macroeconomic peril. Legal rules represent more than mere
regulatory taxes that can be repealed as a tool of stimulus. 
